At the beginning of November 2000 a monument was unveiled in the Latvian city of Lestine. Among the more than 1,000 participants at the festive ceremony was the Latvian Defense Minister, Valdis Kristovkis. The monument is to memorialize those Latvians who served in German SS units during the time of the German occupation from 1941-45. The Federal Republic of Germany also recognizes the "achievements" of the Latvian SS men. While up to now none of the surviving Latvian forced laborers has received a penny in compensation, thousands of Latvians who fought in the service of Germany against their own people have been receiving generous pensions for years in accordance with the German Federal Care Law with no checks for possible criminality.

To today's official Latvia the Latvian SS members are considered heroes in the struggle against Communism and "Russian Bolshevism". However, for a long time service in the SS or in police units during the German occupation was considered, with justification, as the worst form of collaboration. Units with Latvian personnel participated to a large extent in the murder of tens of thousands of Jews, gypsies, captured Red Army soldiers, and suspected Latvian Communists. Their "combat leadership" in the hunt for partisans in Latvia and in other Soviet republics was marked by unusual brutality against the civil population.

With the beginning of the German attack against the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941 anti-soviet oriented Latvians formed so-called self-defense units which took up the war against the Red Army and against Soviet installations. Frequently these units were under the leadership of agents of the German military counter-intelligence or the SS secret service which had set up a network with almost complete coverage of the Baltic region long before the attack. In June of 1941 auxiliary police units and special troops were formed from these units that were initially under the command of the Wehrmacht and a short time later under the command of SS departments. In a report of Task Force A of the Security Police and the Security Service of the SS of July 15, 1941 it is stated that the Latvian Auxiliary Police and two additional Special Units of the SS were assigned "...to carry out pogroms". The preliminary estimate of the report states that , "Many Synagogues were destroyed and so far 400 Jews have been liquidated." On August 10, 1941 the "Senior SS and Police Commander of Ostland" supplemented the report with, "...for the shooting of Communists the police team was brought in as well." The "indigenous" units, armed and led by the SS were the main force of the process of human destruction in the Baltic.

SS Special Unit 2, which administered the annihilation process in Latvia, consisted of 170 Germans in October 1941, to which were assigned 8218 Latvians as executioners. Since Latvia as well as Estonia and Lithuania were to become part of Germany after the war, which was expected to occur in a few weeks, and had in the meantime to be "cleansed" of "racially inferior persons" and political enemies, the murderous campaign went forward at terrific speed and with dreadful efficiency. Of the 70,000 Latvian Jews who fell into the hands of the Germans in 1941 only about 3,450 remained alive by the end of December 1941. After just six months of German occupation 90% of the prewar Jewish population (about 220,000) and 10,000 persons classified as Communists or state-associated in the three Baltic states, and as many Red Army soldiers and thousands of handicapped persons were murdered.

A unit under the command of the former Latvian officer Arajs played a notable, if not unusual, role. This unit, consisting of 1,200 men, was assigned by the SS to carry out mass murders in many cities. It is estimated that more than 45,000 persons were victims of this unit. At the end of 1941 this unit was formally integrated into the SS apparatus and, among other things, was used for guard duty and executions in the Riga (Latvia) concentration camp. Smaller units were no less "effective". On July 32, 1941 Task Group A reported that Latvian "Self Defense" forces under German command had organized a pogrom and "eliminated 1,550 Jews" in Mitau (Jelgava). On August 5, 1941 a small unit of Latvian Auxiliary Police shot over "200 Communists and Jews" in Rossiten (Rezekne). These mass murders were carried out in such a horrible manner that the members of the German Wehrmacht themselves were shocked and could only be calmed down by an order from the Commander of the 281^st Security Division. The German Commissioner General in Mitau reported on August 12, 1941 that the shooting of Jews and "Latvian communist elements" by the Auxiliary Police had reached such a level that the population in the area under his command had been noticeable reduced. As a result of these massacres the population of the city of Subbat "had been reduced by half". Some of the massacres by the Latvian units had been recorded on film and in photographs by the SS. The intent was to have printed evidence against the Latvian executioners in hand to support the propaganda thesis that these indescribable mass murders had not been committed by Germans but rather were "purging actions performed by the Latvians who had been freed from Bolshevism".

In the Fall of 1941 the establishment of Special SS-Police Units of Latvians, initially consisting of 6,000 men, were assigned to the destruction of Jews and the combating of partisans in Belorussia, the Ukraine, and the Russian Federation. In addition to new recruits these consisted primarily of Latvian personnel who had "proved" themselves in the murder Communists and Jews in Latvia.

In January of 1942 the first battalion for combating partisans was transferred to the "Upper SS and Police Commander for Russia Center". The units with Latvian men under German leadership created particular havoc in Belorussia. A German police post reported, for example, that the members of a Latvian battalion shot more than 350 Jews, mostly women and children on October 11, 1942. An SS Command Order of February 5, 1943 ordered the murder of all Jews in the Belorussian city of Sluzk on the 8^th and 9^th of February. The main force of the indescribable massacre that followed "were the 110 members of the Latvian Volunteer Company".

Between February and April of 1943 on the border between Latvia and Belorussia one of the largest hunts for partisans took place under the code name "Winter Magic". At the order of the "Upper SS and Police Commander, Eastland" seven Latvian companies provided the main force. According to the report of the Reich East Ministry, "many hundreds of villages were destroyed, among them several containing many thousands of residents". In these villages, first all men between the ages of 16 and 50 and then "all additional suspicious persons" were shot. Later, the children wandering about were shot like their parents or, in a few cases, distributed amongst Latvian families. In many villages "all residents, including women and children were shot". The purpose of this "campaign", the creation of a 40 kilometer wide pacified zone on the Latvian border, was achieved. The use of Latvians (and Estonians, as well as Lithuanians) in the Slavic settlement areas created hostility between the affected peoples of the Soviet Union that continues to this day - one of the side effects carefully planned by its German directors.

Beginning in May of 1942 the German officials began to establish SS formations whose purpose was no longer only mass murder campaigns against defenseless civilians, but also military combat. The core of the planned Armed SS Formations were the Latvian Auxiliary Police units. However, these squads had to submit to a new qualification test. In addition to the physical qualifications for the military front and primarily the previous demonstration of reliability in the battle against "Jewish Bolshevism", "racial constitution" also played a role. The Germans and the Latvian collaborationist authorities attempted to attract recruits with hysterical anti-bolshevik propaganda as well as promises and threats. Since the number of "racially acceptable" volunteers was insufficient, the Latvian collaborationist authorities, under German pressure, went over to a general mobilization. The conscripts who were not "SS-worthy" were made available to the Wehrmacht for auxiliary service or to the Labor officials as forced labor. In October 1943 the first SS division with Latvian personnel, the "XV Armed Grenadier Division of the SS (Latvian No. 1)" was set up. In January 1944 an additional division with the designation "XIX Grenadier Division of the SS (Latvian No. 2)" was formed.

These divisions were committed to strengthen the stranglehold the Germans had set up around Leningrad. At the recommendation of the Wehrmach leadership Hitler had ordered the city, "the cradle of the Revolution", not to be stormed but rather to be surrounded and then leveled by the artillery and airforce and to have the entire population die of starvation. The siege lasted 900 days. More than half a million civilians died during this time. From the end of 1943, as a result of operations by the Red Army and attacks by partisans, the siege had begun to show cracks. Since the Wehrmacht leadership had no additional German troops at their disposal, the Latvians (and Estonians) were to fill the gaps in the blockade and at the same time, using their notoriously brutal "combat techniques", to provide a graveyard peace at the backs of the German troops. Through recruitment, a large number of Latvians were added to the German armed forces. Eventually almost 150,000 Latvians performed military service for the German occupiers.

This unusually high degree of exploitation of the military potential of an occupied country by the Germans was made possible by the fact that the leading classes in the period before the annexation of Latvia by the Soviet Union in June of 1940, unreservedly sided with the Germans after the German invasion of the USSR on June 22, 1941. With the "annexation" of Latvia (and the two other Baltic states, Lithuania and Estonia) by the Soviet Union that, contrary to the observations of bourgeois historians, was carried by a strong current of pro-Sovietism among the working class, especiallly the Latvian, the previously controlling forces lost their political and economic positions of power. Many of the leading Latvians went underground or into exile in Germany where most of them put themselves at the disposal of the German spy services or the Wehrmacht. The German invasion was seen by these forces as liberation and they believed - in recognition of the war aims of the Germans, which was the total Germanization and annexation of the Baltic states - they would be able to regain their pre-Soviet status. (On the German war aims in the Baltic see junge Welt No. 252 of October 28/29, 2000.) The cooperation with the Germans against the common "Jewish-Bolshewik enemy" was the logical consequence of this perception. In addition, the traditional strong anti-semitic, right-wing extremist, and anti-communist current within the Latvian leading classes had a strong influence. Respected members of the pre-Soviet elite - college teachers, government ministers, party leaders, generals, captains of industry, and religious leaders - sent letters of devotion to Hitler and called their countrymen to the struggle against "Jews and Communists" and to work for the German war economy.

On July 11, 1941 40 leading representatives from the pre-Soviet period assembled in Riga.

They called themselves "Latvian patriots from the most diverse intellectual and commercial circles" and claimed "to legitimately represent the ideas and wishes of the Latvian public". This assembly passed a programmatic declaration demanding the implementation of a fascist dictatorship and the "liberation of Latvia from the Jews and, in principle, from the Russians and Poles as well". Leading elements of the old elite made themselves available for key positions in the collaborating administration - the Latvian General Dankers became the head of the main collaborationist officialdom. The former Latvian government ministers Valdmanis and Berzins (Finance and Propaganda, respectively) took over the same portfolios in the collaborationist administration. The former Latvian War Minister Bangerskis led the establishment of the Latvian SS units, later the SS Divisions, and was rewarded with a promotion to the rank of SS General. The leaders of the Auxiliary Police formations and Special Units were all former Latvian police and military officers. Many of the leading collaborators believed that the establishment of armed units was not only a joint contribution with the Germans in leading the war against the "Jewish-Bolshevik enemy". One cherished the illusory hope that, in view of the German goals, these units could become the nucleus of national Latvian and Military Police formations.

The political views of the elites had great significance for people below them. In addition there was the military-political situation in the summer of 1941. German Fascism appeared to be the historical victor. In view of the overall situation including the increasing impoverishment, to work in the service of the occupier seemed the reasonable thing to do, and increasingly even a question of survival. Apparently an even greater influence on the attitude of many Latvians was the Soviet policy in the Baltics after the annexation in the summer of 1940. To eliminate "bourgeois elements" and presumed or actual "enemies of the Soviet Union" official Soviet agencies implemented a widespread policy of repression in the Baltic republics with all the by then known attributes of Stalinist terror. This policy provided effective arguments to the German propanda. The experiences of many Balts during the time the region was part of the Soviet Union and the propagandistic exploitation of Soviet policies by the Germans and the leading collaborators evidently fostered a readiness for collaboration in the working classes and overcame the positive experiences that many workers had with Soviet power, e.g., land reform and many social improvements for workers.

The individual guilt of the collaborators however is not affected by such a finely differentiated examination of the causes of the willingness to collaboration and it is not mitigated by the social circumstances of those tragic years.